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Third-Party Liability and Adjustments Between
Different Employers and Insurance Carriers
in Tennessee
William I. Harbison*
In this articlethe author discusses the Tennessee law as to the relative
positions of employers and third party tortfeasors in workmen's compen-

sation situations. After discussing the employer's right to subrogationto

his employee's right of action, the employer's right to a lien on any
recovery in such an action, and the right of the third party to indemnity
from the employer, he concludes by treating the problem of joint and

successive employers, taking special note of the heretofore untapped
resources of the Tennessee Second Injury Fund.
I. Trn PARrY ACTIONS AN EMPLOYERS' SUBROGATION
Although it provides an injured workman a relatively assured recovery of prescribed benefits, the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, like that of most jurisdictions, provides benefits which are
quite small compared to the awards usually made in tort actions.
Consequently, if there is some person other than the employer who
may be responsible in tort to the injured workman, the latter generally
desires to bring a damage suit against such third party.
Often, however, difficult questions arise in determining who are
third parties subject to such suits. The right of the employer or his
workmen's compensation insurer to reimbursement or to credit upon
future compensation liability for compensation benefits paid must also
be resolved, as well as adjustment of fees between the attorney for the
employee-plaintiff and the attorney for the employer or insurer.
Further, the right of a third party who has been held liable to an
injured employee to seek indemnity at law or by contract from the
employer may often lead to surprising results. It is not uncommon, for
example, for an employee to receive a large judgment against a third
party, and for the latter in turn to obtain indemnity for the full amount
plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees from the employer of the injured man by reason of an express or implied contract of indemnity
existing between the employer and the third person. Such cases have
arisen with frequency during the past few years-to such an extent,
indeed, that an employer or his insurer should give careful consideration to the consequences before urging an injured employee to bring
*Member, Trabue, Minick, Sturdivant & Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee; Lecturer
in Law, School of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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a third-party action. The "exclusive remedy" provisions so frequently
found in workmen's compensation statutes may well shield the employer from direct tort liability to an injured workman or his family,
but the shield may prove vulnerable indeed to an indemnity suit by
a third party who has been held liable to the injured workman in
tort.' These problems will be considered in subsequent sections of
this article.
In Tennessee, prior to 1949, an injured employee could not receive
workmen's compensation benefits and at the same time pursue a thirdparty action. He had to make a "binding election" between the two
types of recoveries-the two being deemed mutually exclusive. 2 The
Tennessee statutes were amended in 1949, however, to permit the
employee to recover workmen's compensation benefits without surrendering his rights against third parties. 3 Even without the aid of
this legislation, it had not been uncommon for an employer to make a
special agreement with an employee whereby the employer would
make payments equivalent to compensation benefits to the employee,
with the express provision that the employee should be free to pursue
a third-party action. In some instances the employee agreed to reimburse the employer if he succeeded in the damage suit, and in other
4
cases the employer waived any claim for reimbursement.
The 1949 amendment obviated the necessity for special agreements
of this sort, and expressly provided that the employee might take compensation benefits and at the same time sue any third person who
might be legally liable to him. The employer or his insurer was given
a lien upon any recovery made in the third-party action, and the right
to intervene therein to protect the lien. If the third-party action were
not brought by the injured workman (or his dependents, in death
cases) within one year from the date of the injury, the claim was
automatically "assigned" to the employer or his insurer for the purpose
of seeking reimbursement from the third party for compensation paid
or payable to the employee. 5
1. Even where the employee's action is unsuccessful, there may be liability by the

employer to the third party for attorney's fees and suit expenses incurred by the third
party in defense of the employee's suit. Bielawski v. American Export Lines, 220 F.
Supp. 265 (E.D. Va. 1963); Annot., 7 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (1962).
2. Workmen's Compensation Act § 14, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, ch. 123, § 14. Under
this statute, if the employee did take workmen's compensation benefits, the employer
was permitted to sue the third party to obtain reimbursement.
3. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, ch. 277, § 1 (now TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (Supp.
1963)).
4. See, e.g., Keen v. Allison, 166 Tenn. 218, 60 S.W.2d 158 (1933) (employer
waived any claim for reimbursement); International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn.
App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854 (W.S. 1948) (employer to be reimbursed out of recovery).
5. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, ch. 277, § 1, (now TrN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (Supp.
1963)).
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The 1949 legislation remains the basic foundation for third-party
actions by injured workmen in Tennessee, although some significant
amendments were added in 1963. Among these is a provision that the
attorney representing the employee in a successful third-party action
shall be entitled to a reasonable fee for his services and shall have a
first lien on the recovery. If the employer or his insurer has engaged
separate counsel to represent the employer in securing recovery
against the third person, then "a court of competent jurisdiction shall,
upon application, apportion said reasonable fee between the attorney
for the workman and the attorney for the employer, in proportion to
the services rendered." 6 This amendment may help to eliminate an
area of possible friction between plaintiffs' attorneys in tort actions
and subrogation counsel for compensation carriers. Such carriers frequently employ their own counsel to represent their interest in thirdparty actions, but the allocation of fees between the different attorneys
has frequently been a difficult problem.
The 1963 legislation also clarified somewhat the nature and extent
of the subrogation rights of the employer or his compensation carrier.
The statute provides that if the employer has paid compensation
benefits to the employee, he shall have a lien against the recovery
made in the third-party action. If the net third-party recovery
"exceeds the amount paid by the employer, and the employer has not,
at said time, paid and discharged his full maximum liability for workmen's compensation under.., this title, the employer shall be entitled
to a credit on his future liability, as it accrues, to the extent the net
recovery collected exceeds the amount paid by the employer."7 Such
credit is allowed whether or not the employer has intervened in the
third-party action.8
In a significant interpretation of the third-party statutes, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the subrogation claim of the employer
extends not only to statutory medical benefits and compensation payments, but by contract may include extra-legal medical payments as
well.9 At the time of the accident in that case, the applicable statutes
fixed the limit of mandatory medical benefits at 800 dollars. 10 The
employer carried workmen's compensation insurance coverage for its
employees, with an endorsement providing benefits in excess of the
statutory medical allowance up to 10,000 dollars for each employee.
6. TENN.CODE Ar.

§ 50-914 (Supp. 1963).

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. For a construction of the statutes in Tennessee as they existed prior to 1963,
see Martin v. McMinnville, 369 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962), discussing the
allocation of attorneys' fees and the nature and extent of the right of subrogation.
9. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Elam, 198 Tenn. 194, 278 S.W.2d 693 (1955).
10. The limit is now 1800 dollars with an additional amount up to 700 dollars in the
discretion of the court. TENN.CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (Supp. 1963).
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Under this coverage the insurer paid medical expenses for an injured
employee in the amount of 9,060 dollars and forty cents. It intervened
in his third-party action and sought a lien for the excess as well as for
the statutory benefits. The trial court held that the subrogation lien
extended only to the mandatory statutory allowances, but the supreme
court reversed. The court pointed out the social desirability of the employer's providing the additional coverage, and held that the employee
was a third-party beneficiary thereof. The insurance contract contained a general subrogation clause, entitling the carrier to subrogate
upon any right of recovery vested by law in either the employer or
any employee-beneficiary. The court held that the beneficiaries of the
policy took its burdens as well as its benefits and that they were
bound by the subrogation clause insofar as the excess benefits were
concerned; as to the statutory benefits, subrogation was allowed as a
matter of law.
The employer's right of subrogation upon the employee's third-party
recovery exists whether the employee recovers "by judgment, settlement, or otherwise." 1 This provision has been given effect according
to its terms and subrogation has been allowed in cases where an emand where
ployee settled with a third party in exchange for a release'?
13
he obtained settlement under a covenant not to sue.
A. Who Are "Third Persons"?
The third-party statutes permit recovery by the injured workman
or his dependents in cases where legal liability is created "against some
person other than the employer." 14 Just who is such a third person
is not defined by the statutes, although there are some provisions
which bear upon the point.
An important decision of the supreme court interpreting the statutes
held that a fellow employee engaged in the scope of his employment
is not a "third person" and not subject to a common-law action by an
injured employee. 15
In the case of Pierce v. United States, 6 it was held that the United
States may be subjected to third-party suits under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 17 despite the fact that the injured workman had received
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (Supp. 1963).

12. Millican v. Home Stores, Inc., 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372 (1954).
13. Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, 310 S.W.2d 451 (1958).
14. TENr. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (Supp. 1963).

15. Majors v. Moneymaker, 196 Tenn. 698, 270 S.V.2d 328 (1954). For contrary
authority in other jurisdictions, see Martin v. Theockary, 220 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1955).
A physician selected by the employer may not be deemed a fellow employee and may
therefore be subject to a common-law action. Garrison v. Graybeel, 202 Tenn. 567, 308
S.W.2d 375 (1957).
16. 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1956).

17. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958).
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benefits under the state workmen's compensation law. The holding
seems perfectly proper, inasmuch as there is no limitation in the Tennessee law or in the FTCA upon the point. Liability was imposed upon
the United States as landowner for violation of a "non-delegable"
duty toward employees of a contractor in connection with high-tension
electric wires.
One of the leading Tennessee cases upon the subject, as well as upon
the general topic of landowner liability, is InternationalHarvester Co.
v. Sartain.18 Although it arose before the 1949 third-party statute was
enacted, its interpretation of the workmen's compensation statutes is
still quite important. In that case International Harvester as landowner let several independent contracts in connection with the construction of a building upon its premises. An employee of a subcontractor was seriously injured when he came into contact with a hightension electric line which had allegedly been improperly located by
one of the prime contractors. The injured workman was permitted to
maintain a common-law action for damages against both the landowner and the separate contractor-the latter not being in the "chain"
of contract with plaintiffs employer so as to be "insulated" from tort
liability under other provisions of the compensation act. The landowner was held liable upon the basis of violation of a "non-delegable"
duty to the injured man, and the contractor for its negligence in
locating the uninsulated power line.
There have been several other cases in Tennessee in which landowners have been held liable to employees of contractors or subcontractors upon the theory that such persons are invitees and are entitled
to the benefit of certain duties by the landowner in making the
premises safe for work. 19
There are obvious limits to such liability, however. One well-recognized limitation is that a landowner normally has no duty to make
safe for a contractor or his employees the very thing or condition
which the injured worker is engaged to repair or build.20 And of course
the landowner-defendant may also have the benefit of the usual defenses in tort actions, such as lack of negligence on his part or con21
tributory negligence by the plaintiff.
18. Supra note 4.
19. E.g., Bowaters So. Paper Corp. v. Brown, 253 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1958) (employee of independent contractor); Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 46 Tenn. App. 539, 330

S.W.2d 569 (E.S. 1959) (painter injured when steel pole on owner's premises collapsed
while being painted; defect in pole known to owner but not to painter or his employer
who had the painting contract).
20. See Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, supra note 19; Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1953);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoI), TORTS § 422 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).

21. Cart v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 153 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Tenn. 1957);
Monday v. Reed, 47 Tenn. App. 656, 341 S.W.2d 755 (E.S. 1960).
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Further, the compensation act itself has long provided that principal
or intermediate contractors and subcontractors are liable for compensation benefits to the employees of their subcontractors injured while
"engaged upon the subject-matter of the contract."= Liability is imposed upon such contractors to the same extent as upon the immediate
employer. The statute applies only to injuries which occur "on, in, or
about the premises on which the principal contractor has undertaken
to execute work or which are otherwise under his control or management."m Obviously, since such contractors have liability under the
compensation law,24 they are not "third parties" subject to commonlaw actions.25
As pointed out above, a landowner frequently is deemed a third
party, subject to common-law actions. It is entirely possible, however,
for a landowner to be deemed a "contractor" or "principal contractor,"
so as to be liable for compensation benefits to an injured employee,2
and by the same token to be shielded from tort liability to such employee? Ordinarily the landowner is not so shielded, but if he is
engaged in the "building business," he may be deemed to be a contractor, so that the exclusive remedy of an injured worker would be
under the compensation law.2 Of course, in view of the unlimited
exposure in common-law tort actions, this may be a desirable result
from the standpoint of the defendant; and it is entirely possible that
many employers would prefer to be held "contractors" with the limited
exposure of compensation benefits, than to be deemed "third persons"
subject to tort actions.
Other instances of third-party actions are found in common-carrier
cases. In several cases the shipper of goods has been held liable to
employees of carriers for negligence of the shipper in stowing a cargo
for carriage.2 9 As hereinafter pointed out, however, the shipper may
CODE AqN. § 50-915 (1956).
23. Ibid. An important construction of the term "premises" is found in Davis v.
J & B Motor Lines, 193 Tenn. 233, 245 S.W.2d 769 (1951), where a highway was
held to constitute the premises for a hauling contract.
24. Bowling v. Whitley, 208 Tenn. 657, 348 S.W.2d 310 (1961) (prime contractor
liable for compensation benefits to employee of subcontractor even though latter had
too few employees to be subject to compensation law).
25. Adams v. Hercules Powder Co., 180 Tenn. 340, 175 S.W.2d 319 (1943).
26. Glendening v. London Assur. Co., 206 Tenn. 601, 336 S.W.2d 535, rehearing
denied, 206 Tenn. 613, 337 S.W.2d 693 (1960).
27. Billings v. Dugger, 362 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
28. In the case of Rutledge v. Burrum (Tenn. 1962, unreported), the Tennessee
Supreme Court carried to extreme lengths the concept of "contractor." The court held
that the defendant, who was building a home for himself and not for sale, and who
was acting as his own "contractor," was liable for compensation benefits to a workman
injured on the job. Two of the justices dissented, and on petition for rehearing the
court reversed itself and dismissed the suit, withdrawing from publication its original
opinion.
29. General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied, 272

22. TENN.
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be able to obtain indemnity from the carrier-employer in such cases,
thus shifting the burden of tort liability to the latter.
II. INDEMNITY ACnONS BY TimfD PERSONS AGAINST EMPLOYERS

The Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act contains an "exclusive
remedy" provision similar to that found in many such acts, providing
that the statutory compensation benefits shall "exclude all other rights
and remedies" of an injured employee or his dependents, "at common
law or otherwise," on account of the injury or death of the employee. 30
By the terms of an amendment in 1961, the exclusive remedy provisions apply to a minor "whether lawfully or unlawfully employed." 31
This amendment would seem to shield an employer from common-law
liability to minors employed in violation of the various child labor
statutes, and at the same time assure such minors of workmen's compensation benefits.
Under the terms of this provision, it has been held that the wife of
an injured workman may not recover from the employer for loss of
consortium of her husband.n The Tennessee Supreme Court expressed
doubt as to the existence of such an action at common law in this
state, but held that. no such right could be exercised in any event
against an employer operating under the compensation act.
Despite the existence of the "exclusive remedy" provisions of various
state compensation acts, however, it has been held that such statutes
may not operate to deprive injured employees of "federally-created"
rights under various federal statutes, or in admiralty.
One of the most important problems in connection with the exclusive remedy provision is whether this statute shields the employer from
actions for contribution or indemnity by third parties who have first
been held liable in tort to injured employees. 4 Such liability of the
employer may be claimed by reason of a contractual relationship between the employer and the third person (indemnity by express or
implied contract); or it may be claimed by reason of statutory or common-law principles, such as a statutory right of contribution among
tortfeasors, or legal indemnity by reason of an alleged active-passive
tortfeasor relationship. It is obvious that if the employer is required to
reimburse the third party, wholly or in part, then to that extent the
F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960).

The opinion of the

district court is reported at 170 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1959).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-908 (Supp. 1963).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-908 (Supp. 1963).
32. Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 250 S.W.2d 35 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962);
Superior Oil Co., 207 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1962).

34. See Note, 13 VAND. L. REV. 772 (1960); 4 VAND. L. REv. 379 (1951).

Matherne v.
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burden of a tort judgment is being shifted to the employer. Indirectly
he is being made to pay for his employee's injuries in a manner different from that specified in the workmen's compensation statutes.
Although the Tennessee appellate courts have not themselves passed
upon the question of an employer's liability to third persons despite
the exclusive remedy feature of the Tennessee statutes, there has been
an important construction of the Tennessee law by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In General Electric Co. v.

Moretz,35 it was held that the exclusive remedy provision does not
shield the employer from liability; he may have to indemnify third
persons by reason of contractual relationships between him and the
latter.
In the Moretz case, a shipper of goods was held liable to a truck
driver injured when the cargo shifted in transit and caused an accident.
Liability was imposed because of negligence of the shipper in loading
the cargo. The injured employee had received workmen's compensation benefits from the trucking company's insurer. The latter intervened and asserted its subrogation lien in the third-party action of
the employee against the shipper. The shipper then sought and obtained indemnity from the trucking company on the theory that the
contract of carriage had implicit in it an obligation of the trucking
firm to indemnify the shipper. By accepting the cargo for carriage,
the carrier was said impliedly to have contracted to see that it was
properly loaded and safe for the journey. The primary burden of
seeing that this was done was held to rest upon the carrier. Therefore
full indemnity was allowed to the shipper against the carrier. The
court expressly disallowed the carrier's claim that its exclusive liability
36
was fixed by the Tennessee compensation law.

Of course, the United States Supreme Court has for several years
been broadening the scope of employer liability to indemnify third
persons who have been held liable to injured workers. Through the
device of implying a contract of indemnity from an agreement to do
a job in a workmanlike manner, the Court has readily imposed upon
stevedoring companies an obligation to indemnify shipowners held
liable to stevedore employees, and has declined to shield an employer
from such liability merely because the employer's liability to his own
employee is exclusively fixed in a compensation statute.31 The Moretz
35. Supra note 29.
36. Reversing the lower court on this point. See the district court opinion, 170 F.
Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1959).
37. See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
In later cases the duty to indemnify has been extended to third persons not in direct
privity of contract with the employer. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara,
Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959). For possible limits on the obligation to indemnify, however, see Atlantic &
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case seems consistent with these holdings and will probably be followed by the Tennessee courts.
Further, there has been a noticeable trend in recent years in the
interpretation of indemnity or hold-harmless agreements. Liability is
being readily imposed in many cases under such agreements where
it was denied in earlier years. Such agreements are found in nearly
every major construction contract. Formerly an indemnity agreement
was interpreted so as to make the indemnitor liable only when his own
negligence or fault caused loss to the indemnitee.3 The indemnitor
was usually not required to reimburse the indemnitee for the consequences of the latter's own negligence unless the contract so specified
in clear terms. More recently, however, courts have been inclined to
impose liability upon an indemnitor under an indemnity agreement,
whether the loss resulted from his own or from the indemnitee's fault,
or from both.3 The Ryan, Moretz, and related cases discussed above
may be regarded as part of this broader trend. In many cases where
the employer is made to respond to a third party, the third party has
first been found negligent toward an injured employee. He is then
allowed to recover from the employer under an express or implied
indemnity agreement, despite the third party's own antecedent and
causative negligence; he is being indemnified in such instances against
his own negligence by virtue of his contract with the employer.
In general, there has not been the same tendency to impose indemnity liability upon employers under tort principles as has been
found in the field of contractual indemnity. It is well settled in Tennessee, for example, as in several other states, that a "passive" tort40
feasor can recover full indemnity from an "active" joint tortfeasor.
It might be possible, therefore, for a "passive" third party who had
been held liable to an employee to seek indemnity from an employer
on the theory that the latter was an "active" joint wrongdoer. This
might be asserted where there was no indemnity contract or perhaps
as an alternative theory of liability. The tendency here, however, has
been to hold the employer shielded from liability by the "exclusive
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962) (where owner's
fault found by jury to have caused injury and not to have been attributable to any
breach of contractual duty by stevedoring company, owner held not entitled to indemnity).
38. See generally 27 Am. Jur. Indemnity § 15 (1940); id. (Supp. 1963); Annot.,
175 A.L.R. 12, 18, 37 (1948).
39. See, e.g., Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 316 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.
1963), affirming Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 202 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Tex.
1962); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Wilson, 304 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1962); Spence &
Howe Constr. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1963). See also General
Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Smith & Oby Co., 272 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1959),
rehearingdenied, 274 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1960).
40. Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933).
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remedy" features of compensation statutes.4 1 The same result has been
reached generally where contribution, rather than indemnity, has been
sought from the employer. 42 At the present time, therefore, the employer's principal risk of "back-door" liability seems to lie in the field
of contract rather than tort, though it must be remembered that the
courts are far from loathe to imply a promise to indemnify.
III. LIABILITY OF JOINT AND SuccEssivE EMPLOYERS

The Tennessee statutes expressly provide for apportionment of
workmen's compensation benefits among joint employers of an injured workman.4 3 Where, however, there are successive employers,
and the injured workman sustains injury while in the employment of
both, the Tennessee Supreme Court has expressly declined to allow
contribution or apportionment between the two employers." The last
employer is held in such cases to take the employee as he finds him,
and is liable for any aggravation or reinjury without any sharing of
responsibility by former employers.45 Of course, the principle of apportionment or contribution is denied by statute in occupational
disease cases."
A seldom-tapped but useful resource in limiting the exposure of a
second employer under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act is
the Second Injury Fund.47 The statute creating the fund refers to the
loss of or loss of use of "another member" by an employee who has previously suffered the loss of or loss of use of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or
eye. The second injury must result in total permanent disability. In
a recent decision, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
the second "member" may consist of the back or other portion of the
body than those listed in connection with the first injury.48 Possibly
the decision will make more readily available the resources of this
fund, which has accumulated to sizeable proportions but which is
rarely used.
41. 2 LArSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 76.10 (1961); Note, 13 VAND. L.
REv. 523, 539 (1960).
42. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957); Note, 13 VAND. L. REV. 772, 782 (1960). For
cases on contribution among tortfeasors generally in Tennessee, see Huggins v. Graves,

210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232
S.W.2d 355 (1950).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1012 (1956).
44. Baxter v. Smith, 364 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. 1962).

45. In an earlier decision the Tennessee Supreme Court had imposed "joint and
several" liability upon successive employers in connection with an eye injury. J. E.
Greene Co. v. Bennett, 207 Tenn. 635, 341 S.W.2d 751 (1960). The Baxter case ap-

pears to modify, if not to overrule entirely, the earlier case.
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1106 (1956).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1027 (1956).

48. Stovall v. General Shoe Corp., 204 Tenn. 358, 321 S.W.2d 559 (1959).

